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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to analyze the connection between anti-crisis fiscal measures 
adopted by EU governments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and these 
countries’ GDP growth. The study relies on methods of statistical analysis, including 
cluster analysis, to examine the challenges of forecasting tax revenue collections during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. It is possible to make preliminary conclusions regarding the 
relationship between fiscal anti-crisis measures in EU countries and these countries’ 
GDP growth even in the absence of the actual data. The study has revealed variations 
in forecast GDP growth caused by a higher than usual degree of uncertainty. The best 
way to minimize such variations is to constantly monitor the situation and adjust the 
forecast estimates depending on the changes in the relevant factors. The variations in 
forecast estimates can also stem from adjustments for the changes in tax revenues of 
EU countries implementing fiscal anti-crisis measures. Most EU countries resorted to 
such instruments as deferral of certain tax payments, temporary tax breaks, reduction 
of tax rates, tax loss carryforwards, cancellation or reductions of social contributions. 
The European leaders in terms of anti-crisis fiscal measures are the Czech Republic 
and Ireland – these countries used four out of five instruments and were followed by 
Austria, Hungary and the UK, which used three instruments. We also analyzed the 
coefficient of tax elasticity for European countries and demonstrated that tax reliefs (tax 
preferences) influence the level of tax revenue. The hypothesis that there is an indirect 
connection between the anti-crisis fiscal measures and GDP growth was confirmed. 
It is shown that clusters of EU countries grouped depending on their anti-crisis fiscal 
measures do not coincide with the clusters of countries grouped depending on their 
GDP growth estimates. Thus, a tentative forecast can be made that the fiscal anti-crisis 
measures taken by EU countries will not have a direct impact on their GDP growth. 
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Цель исследования – провести анализ взаимосвязи принятых в условиях рас-
пространения COVID-19 фискальных антикризисных мер и показателя валового 
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внутреннего продукта в странах Евросоюза. В исследовании применяются мето-
ды статистического анализа, в том числе кластерного анализа, и рассматривает-
ся вопрос: в чем сложность прогнозирования налоговых поступлений в услови-
ях пандемии COVID-19? Результаты исследования показали, что до получения 
фактических данных возможно сделать предварительные выводы относительно 
взаимосвязи принятых в странах ЕС фискальных антикризисных мер в ответ на 
COVID-19 на показатель ВВП. Были выявлены отклонения в прогнозах показате-
лей ВВП, обусловленные факторами неопределенности, наилучшей мерой ниве-
лирования которых является постоянный мониторинг и пересмотр прогнозных 
показателей в зависимости от влияния изменяющихся факторов. На отклонения 
в прогнозах могли повлиять в том числе корректировки, вызванные изменениями 
показателей налоговых поступлений, обусловленные предпринятыми странами 
Евросоюза фискальными антикризисными мерами. Среди этих мер чаще всего 
использовались такие инструменты как отсрочка уплаты налогов, временные 
налоговые льготы, снижение ставок налогов, перенос убытков, отмена/сниже-
ние социальных взносов. Было выявлено, что лидером среди стран по принятию 
антикризисных фискальных мер являются Чехия и Ирландия, которыми задей-
ствованы 4 инструмента антикризисных мер из пяти рассматриваемых. Австрия, 
Венгрия и Великобритания использовали 3 инструмента. Проведен анализ ко-
эффициента эластичности налогов в разрезе стран Евросоюза. Показано, что на 
показатель налоговых поступлений оказывают влияние налоговые льготы (пре-
ференции). Подтверждена гипотеза о существовании косвенной связи между 
принятыми антикризисными фискальными мерами и показателем ВВП. В то же 
время показано, что кластеры стран Евросоюза, сгруппированных по признаку 
принятых антикризисных фискальных мер не совпадают с кластерами стран ЕС, 
сгруппированных по изменению прогнозов ВВП. Сделан предварительный про-
гноз, что фискальные антикризисные меры, предпринятые в странах Евросоюза, 
не окажут прямого влияния на изменение показателей ВВП. 
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
фискальные антикризисные меры, налоговые льготы, налоговые преференции, 
налоговые поступления, валовый внутренний продукт, коэффициент эластич-
ности налогов
1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has 
changed the world in many ways and se-
verely disrupted the global economy. The 
leading experts are unanimous in their 
predictions that the pandemic will have 
a negative impact on national economies, 
the only thing that differs is the scale of 
this negative impact. 
What complicates the situation even 
more is the lack of reliable information 
in the key parameters that can be used 
to estimate the impact of the pandemic 
on national economies and on the global 
economy in general. First of all, it is dif-
ficult to predict the duration of the pan-
demic since after a short-term decline in 
the number of cases, a new resurgence 
has started again and the governments 
have to adapt flexibly to these constantly 
changing conditions. Moreover, we do 
not have the reliable data on the efficacy 
of Covid-19 vaccines yet, which means 
that vaccination is by no means certain to 
become a panacea for the spread of coro-
navirus. New COVID-19 flare-ups create 
difficulties for predicting accurately when 
the pandemic will have run its course.
Therefore, the pandemic creates a 
higher-than-usual degree of uncertain-
ty around economic forecasting. In order 
to minimize the difference between the 
predicted and actual data, analysts use 
multiple scenarios, which can differ con-
siderably from each other. 
The European Union (EU) took vigo- 
rous action to tackle the negative ef-
fects of the pandemic in such spheres as 
health care, economy, research, border 
mobility, etc. The documents regulating 
these policies are available on the official 
EU website1.
1 List of key documents. Available at:  https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/content/news/index.html.
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The European Commission monitors 
the economic indicators affected by these 
measures and adjusts the initial forecasts 
accordingly, which allows us to make 
some preliminary estimates of the impact 
that European countries’ anti-crisis mea-
sures had on their GDP. A key role in this 
respect is played by fiscal anti-crisis mea-
sures, which can have short-term as well 
as long-term economic effects. 
These effects are quite complex and 
can be found in different spheres, which 
is why they can be difficult to evaluate. It 
would be appropriate to use the amount 
of tax revenues (both short- and long-
term) as the key indicator for our analy-
sis. However, the first data on collections 
for specific types of taxes will be avai-
lable only after the tax revenue data for 
2020 are processed, which will happen 
later than usual due to delayed tax filing 
deadlines.
Nevertheless, it is already possible to 
make the first preliminary estimates by 
using the available data from interim re-
ports, which leads us to chose GDP growth 
in EU countries as the main indicator.
The aim of this study is to analyze the 
connection between the anti-crisis fiscal 
measures adopted by EU governments in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic and 
these countries’ GDP growth.
We have formulated two opposite hy-
potheses: 
Hypothesis 1. The fiscal anti-crisis 
measures taken by EU countries have a 
direct or indirect influence on indicators 
of GDP.
Hypothesis 2. The fiscal anti-crisis 
measures taken by EU countries have no 
influence on indicators of GDP. 
The paper is structured as follows. 
The second section reviews the research 
literature on the effects of fiscal policies on 
macro-economic indicators. The third sec-
tion describes our research methodology 
and hypotheses. The fourth section con-
tains our calculations and analysis of the 
coefficients of tax elasticity for EU coun-
tries. The fifth section analyzes the prob-
lems of forecasting the changes in the eco-
nomic indicators during the pandemic by 
focusing on the case of GDP. The sixth sec-
tion presents a statistical analysis of fiscal 
measures used by EU countries to tackle 
the pandemic-induced crisis. The seventh 
section describes the results of clustering 
of EU countries according to their anti-cri-
sis measures and the projections of GDP 
growth. The final section contains our con-
clusions and outlines the avenues for fu-
ture research. 
2. Literature review
There is a vast body of research on the 
relationship between fiscal policies and 
macro-economic indicators. For example, 
I. Loukianova et al. [1] proposed and con-
firmed the hypothesis that the fiscal and 
monetary policies working together can 
have a synergistic effect on economic 
growth and that at certain stages one of 
these policies prevails over the other.
Fundamental studies of various eco-
nomic, social, political and philosophical 
problems, including those related to the 
sphere of taxation, were conducted by 
F. Knight [2]. J. Mirrlees [3] conducted 
research in the domain of welfare econo-
mics, taxation theory, government spen-
ding, contract theory, theories of growth 
and development economics.
W. Niskanen [4] analyzed the effects 
of voting rules, progressive taxation and 
the length of the fiscal horizon of demo-
cratic governments.
A. Philippopoulos [5] conducted an 
empirical study of the role and efficiency 
of the public sector, public policy regulat-
ing labour relations and wages, privatiza-
tion, fiscal policy and financial stability.
V. Vishnevsky and A. Polovyan [6] 
considered the difficulties of substantia-
tion of fiscal and monetary measures used 
to regulate an emergent economy with the 
help of evolutionary modelling methods. 
The results of their computational ex-
periments have shown that the success of 
economic regulation depends on the ini-
tial state of the institutional environment. 
From the perspective of evolutionary eco-
nomics, a fiscal policy applied in emer-
ging markets retains its regulatory capa- 
city, and therefore requires further re-
forms in the context of the ‘new reality’ 
based on the global value chains.
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P. Nijkamp and J. Poot [7] used a 
sample of 93 published studies, yielding 
123 meta-observations, to examine the 
robustness of the evidence regarding the 
effect of fiscal policy on economic growth 
and found that the evidence for a posi-
tive effect of conventional fiscal policy on 
growth is rather weak.
N. Gemmell et al. [8] suggest that 
previously estimated ‘long-run’ growth 
effects of fiscal policy are typically 
achieved quickly, consistent with results 
from short-run models. In principle, 
these short-run effects ‘persist’ while in 
practice, regular fiscal policy changes in 
OECD countries mean that persistent 
increases or decreases in growth rates 
are rare.
Ch. Erceg et al. [9] presented a sys-
tematic analysis of the short-run effects 
of trade policies that are equivalent in a 
frictionless economy, namely a uniform 
increase in import tariffs and export subsi-
dies, an increase in value-added taxes ac-
companied by a payroll tax deduction, and 
a border adjustment of corporate taxation. 
The authors concluded that an increase 
in import tariffs and export subsidies is 
likely to elicit a much smaller response of 
the exchange rate than required for “full 
insulation” to hold, so that expenditure-
switching effects show through to higher 
output. This output stimulus is largely 
driven by the export subsidy whereas ta-
riffs tend to have a negligible or even con-
tractionary effect on output [9, p. 37]. 
R. Boadway [10] charts the evolu-
tion of optimal tax analysis and discusses 
the lessons it holds for tax policy. He de-
scribes the theoretical challenges posed by 
recent findings in such fields as behavioral 
economics and social choice and considers 
how optimal tax analysis might adapt to 
these new paradigms. 
Sh. Anwar showed that tax decentra-
lization is a pre-requisite for sub-national 
credit market access. In countries with 
highly centralized tax bases, unrestrained 
credit market access by subnational go-
vernments poses a risk for macro stabili-
zation policies of the national government 
as the private sector anticipates a higher 
level government bailout in the event of 
default and does not discount the risks of 
such lending properly [11, p. 40]. 
C. Romer and D. Romer investigated 
the causes and consequences of chan- 
ges in the level of taxation in the postwar 
United States and concluded that despite 
the complexity of the legislative process, 
most significant tax changes have a domi-
nant motivation that fits fairly clearly into 
one of four categories: counteracting other 
influences on the economy, paying for in-
creases in government spending (or lowe-
ring taxes in response to reductions in 
spending), addressing an inherited budget 
deficit, and promoting long-run growth. 
The last two motivations are essentially 
unrelated to other factors influencing out-
put, and so policy actions taken because of 
them can be used to estimate the effects of 
tax changes on output [12, p. 799].
S. Folster and M. Henrekson con-
ducted an econometric panel study on 
a sample of rich countries covering the 
1970–1995 period and concluded that 
when the rich country sample is exten- 
ded to non-OECD countries, both go-
vernment expenditure and taxation are 
negatively associated with economic 
growth [13, p. 15]. 
S. James et al. [14] analyze a range 
of manifestations of simplification in 
taxation, including tax systems, tax law, 
taxpayer communications and tax ad-
ministration. A. Laffer et al. [15] have 
demonstrated that elimination or lower-
ing of excessive tax burden on the level of 
individual states in the USA boosts eco-
nomic growth and prosperity. 
There is a number of seminal works 
devoted to tax reforms in a time of crisis: 
for example, R. De Mooij, G. Nicodème 
analyze the impact of bank levies or the 
financial activities tax (FAT) imposed on 
the financial sector, whose introduction 
was considered as a possible response to 
the financial crisis by the European Com-
mission and IMF [16].
J. Alworth and G. Arachi [17] analyze 
the strengths and weaknesses of various 
fiscal initiatives, including limitations on 
the tax advantages to debt financing, spe-
cial taxes on the financial sector and finan-
cial transactions taxes.
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E. Engen and J. Skinner [18] found 
evidence of modest effects, on the order 
of 0.2 to 0.3 percentage point differences 
in growth rates in response to a major tax 
reform. Nevertheless, according to these 
authors, even such small effects can have 
a large cumulative impact on living stan-
dards.
M. Piqué and J. Martín [19] provide 
evidence of delayed adverse effects of the 
fiscal policy in Spain on the rate of growth 
of public spending and on the growth rate 
of GDP. The authors demonstrate that the 
delayed effects of the rate of decline in 
public investment have a negative impact 
on economic growth. 
Z. Yang [20] analyzed the heteroge-
neous responses to the changes in the 
policy of budget decentralization intro-
duced as a part of the 1994 tax reform in 
China and showed the non-linearity of 
these responses. The impact of decentra-
lization of revenues and expenditures on 
economic growth was different across the 
three key sectors. Interestingly, this mea-
sures had the biggest influence on the 
secondary sector. The author also demon-
strated that there is an inverted U-shaped 
dependency relationship between the 
degree of decentralization of revenues 
and expenditures and the growth in the 
secondary sector.
A. Alesina and F. Giavazzi [21] ana-
lyze how fiscal policy after a financial cri-
sis focuses on the effects of fiscal stimuli 
and increased government spending. They 
also discuss the merits of alternate means 
of debt reduction through decreased go-
vernment spending or increased taxes and 
investigate how the short-term political 
forces driving fiscal policy might be ba-
lanced with aspects of the long-term plan-
ning that governs monetary policy.
C. Cottarelli et al. [22] examine the fis-
cal vulnerabilities before a financial crisis, 
the composition of fiscal stimulus packa-
ges in countries with developed and de-
veloping economies. 
J. Shemrod [23] analyzes the fiscal 
policy during the period of economic 
downtown of 2008–2009, concluding that 
public finance economists need to better 
integrate the economic analysis of taxation 
with the concerns and expertise of macro-
economists, finance economists, and ac-
countants. 
J. Brondolo [24] investigates different 
aspects of businesses declaring tax losses 
during an economic crisis to find that tax 
losses present a growing compliance risk 
and that tax authorities should give grea-
ter attention to verifying doubtful claims. 
O. Blanchard and D. Leigh [25] ana-
lyzed questions of forecasting tax reve-
nues such as the relationship between 
growth forecast errors and planned fiscal 
consolidation during the period of crisis. 
They found that in advanced economies, 
stronger planned fiscal consolidation has 
been associated with lower growth than 
expected, with the relation being particu-
larly strong, both statistically and econo-
mically, early in the crisis. Fiscal multip-
liers turned out to be substantially higher 
than implicitly assumed by forecasters. 
A. Alesina et al. [26] considered the 
largest cases of fiscal adjustments in the 
last 25 years in Western Europe and their 
political consequences. The authors con-
cluded that it is possible for fiscally re-
sponsible governments to engage in large 
fiscal adjustments and survive politically. 
Fiscal adjustments based upon spen- 
ding cuts are more successful, that is, they 
lead to more stable consolidations of the 
budget and cause less contraction of the 
economy than tax increases.
M. Hallerberg and C. Scartascini [27] 
showed that during banking crises, the 
need for fiscal reforms is generally higher. 
During electoral periods, increasing taxes 
becomes highly unlikely, even if the go-
vernment is facing financing problems. 
What is more, Hallerberg and Scartaschini 
argue, politics seems to trump econo- 
mics: banking crises do not affect the pro-
bability of having a reform during electo-
ral times. The presence of an IMF program 
affects the tax instruments chosen: coun-
tries with a program increase the value-
added tax, while those without it raise the 
personal income tax.
By using the case of the USA, J. Mike-
sell [28] has shown that the nature of 
changes of the state tax policy can be eco-
nomically destabilizing: in certain years, 
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states are highly likely to raise taxes for 
a number of reasons unconnected to the 
national policy of aggregate demand. The 
budget and fiscal policy should be able to 
counteract this potentially destabilizing 
force which has nothing to do with the 
normal federal control.
R. Chirinko and D. Wilson [29] point 
out the importance of tax incentives and 
interstate capital flows, which are an essen-
tial element of tax competition. Own-state 
capital formation is substantially increased 
by tax-induced reductions in the own-state 
price of capital and is substantially de-
creased by tax-induced reductions in the 
price of capital in competitive-states.
G. Crespi et al. [30] investigated the 
effects of a tax credit scheme for promo-
ting firm-level innovation investment in 
Argentina. Their results suggest that the 
intervention has been effective in increa-
sing firms’ innovation efforts. However, 
effects vary depending on the type of in-
novation investment being subsidized, in-
dustrial sector, and size of the firm.  
A. Easson and E. Zolt [31] found that 
tax incentives can play a positive role in 
stimulation of domestic and foreign in-
vestsment. In particular they emphasize 
that incentive programs should be de-
signed in such a way as to minimize the 
opportunities for corruption in the gran-
ting of incentive and for taxpayer abuse in 
exploiting the tax benefit. 
T. Yefimenko [32] argues that a tax sys-
tem as a strategic instrument of state regu-
lation should include effective mechanisms 
of taxes and levies as well as tax incentives 
and preferences aligned with the key ex-
penditure areas, transfers and subsidies. 
M. Bonucchi et al. [33] concluded that 
the overall effects of reducing the corpo-
rate tax burden need to be assessed in a 
macroeconomic equilibrium context ac-
counting for endogenous spillovers and 
feedback loops across various sectors of 
the economy. Over the years, temporary 
tax incentives have made an important 
contribution to boosting investment and 
economic activity during downturns. Re-
ductions in tax rates have had a smaller, 
but permanent effect imposing a minimal 
burden on economic activity. Temporary 
fiscal incentives generate important posi-
tive economic effects, with long-lasting 
consequences for economic dynamics and 
welfare. 
B. Kalaš and V. Mirovic [34] found a 
strong and positive relationship between 
tax revenue growth and corporate income 
tax, on the one hand, and the growth in 
gross domestic product, on the other 
hand. At the same time these authors ar-
gue that personal income tax and social 
security contributions are weakly related 
to gross domestic product growth.  
A. Pogorleckij [35] demonstrates that 
the majority of tax regulation programs 
during the COVID-19 pandemic resem-
ble those that were previously used dur-
ing other pandemics. A new effect of the 
COVID-19 pandemic found by A. Po-
rogrleckij for indirect taxation is the pro-
posal of a unification of VAT and excise 
duties that was put on the international 
agenda and discussed by the correspon-
ding international tax institutions. 
Despite such substantial body of re-
search, however, the connection between 
economic indicators and fiscal anti-crisis 
measures still remains a largely underex-
plored question.
3. Methodology
The study relies on qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Qualitative me-
thods are applied to describe the essen-
tial elements of fiscal anti-crisis measures 
taken by EU countries in response to the 
pandemic and to highlight the key charac-
teristics of tax relief.
Quantitative methods are applied to 
analyze fiscal anti-crisis measures and GDP 
growth during the pandemic in EU coun-
tries. The calculations were made with the 
help of Excel and Statistica software. The 
databases for computations were obtained 
from the EU2 and IMF websites3. 
2 European Economic Forecast. Summer 




3 International Monetary Fund. Policy 
responses to COVID-19. Policy Tracker. Available 
at:  https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-
covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#A.
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At the first stage of our study, we cal-
culated and analyzed coefficients of tax 
elasticity for different EU countries.
The coefficient of tax elasticity was 








where Tax is the indicator of total receipts 
from taxes and social contributions, euro;
and GDP is gross domestic product, euro.
This indicator reflects the elasticity of 
tax revenue, showing its response to the 
changes in the key economic parame-ters 





Tax revenue can be considered elas-
tic if its percent change causes a com-
paratively substantial (rapid) percent 
change in gross domestic product (in 
absolute terms). In other words, tax re-
venues are considered elastic provided 
that KTAX > 1.
At the second stage, we analyzed 
challenges in forecasting economic indica-
tors during the pandemic and focused on 
the case of gross domestic product.
At the third stage, we conducted a 
statistical analysis of the efficiency of EU 
countries’ fiscal responses to the COVID-19 
pandemic.
At the fourth stage, individual EU 
countries were clustered in accordance 
with their fiscal anti-crisis measures and 
GDP growth forecasts. 
4. Analysis of coefficients of tax 
elasticity for EU countries
To draw preliminary conclusions con-
cerning the relationship between GDP 
and the indicator “Total Receipts from 
Taxes and Social Contributions” (and thus 
to test Hypothesis 1), we calculated the co-
efficient of tax elasticity (KTAX). 
Our analysis of the coefficient of tax 
elasticity for different EU countries is 
summarized in Table 1.
Figure 1 provides a graphic illustra-
tion of the coefficient of tax elasticity in 
EU countries.
In almost all European countries, 
the coefficient of tax elasticity exceeds 1, 
which signifies the elasticity of tax receipts 
with respect to GDP growth (Nominal ex-
penditure). However, we believe it is too 
early to make predictions as to whether 
this tendency will persist during the pan-
demic or not. 
According to IMF analysts, ‘the 
frequently-used method of forecasting 
revenue by applying an aggregate tax 
buoyancy to GDP forecasts is usually 
reasonably reliable, but often likely to 
overestimate revenue during the pan-
demic’. In our view, there is sense in this 
statement. “The buoyancy is the percent 
change in total tax revenue resulting 
from one percent change in GDP. The 
buoyancy thus reflects both structural 
features of the economy and tax system 
and policy measures taken over the cycle. 
In exceptional times, including in the cur-
rent pandemic, it is unlikely that the his-
torical relationship remains unchanged. 
Making projections based on such rela-
tionship can thus lead to – often but not 
always upward – biased projections”’4. 
However, even if we are very cau-
tious in our predictions, the available 
data still point to the fact that there is a 
dependency between tax revenue and 
GDP growth. It could not, therefore, be 
said that there is no inverse relationship 
since the level of taxation in a country 
influences indirectly the consumption 
of resources. Thus, we can conclude that 
fiscal policy actions ta-ken in response to 
the COVID-19 pande-mic and resulting 
in a decline in tax collections also have an 
indirect effect on GDP. 
5. Forecasts of GDP growth in Europe
As our review of the research litera-
ture has shown, the projections of the key 
economic indicators for the European 
Union and the world for 2020–2021 have 
been revised several times.
4 Challenges in Forecasting Tax Revenue. 
Special Series on Fiscal Policies to Respond 
to COVID-19 Available at: https://www.imf.
org/en/Publications/SPROLLs/covid19-
special-notes.




Computation of tax elasticity for EU countries in 2017–2018
Country
Total receipts from taxes and social 
contributions, Million euro
GDP (Nominal expenditure), 
Million euro KTAX
2017 2018 Variation 2017 2018 Variation
Austria 156303.70 164481.90 0.0523 370296 385712 0.0416 1.26
Belgium 206670.50 213452.30 0.0328 445957 459532 0.0304 1.08
Bulgaria 15315.60 16690.10 0.0897 52310 56087 0.0722 1.24
Croatia 18510.20 19864.40 0.0732 49094 51625 0.0516 1.42
Cyprus 6625.10 7100.50 0.0718 20040 21138 0.0548 1.31
Czechia 67523.30 74832.40 0.1082 191722 207570 0.0827 1.31
Denmark 136743.50 136191.30 –0.0040 292408 301341 0.0305 –0.13
Estonia 7776.50 8549.80 0.0994 23776 26036 0.0951 1.05
Finland 96990.00 99095.00 0.0217 225836 233619 0.0345 0.63
France 1104771.00 1133347.00 0.0259 2295063 2353090 0.0253 1.02
Germany 1322134.00 1380268.00 0.0440 3244990 3344370 0.0306 1.44
Greece 74467.00 76387.00 0.0258 180218 184714 0.0249 1.03
Hungary 48078.00 50070.10 0.0414 125603 133782 0.0651 0.64
Ireland 68313.00 74024.00 0.0836 297131 324038 0.0906 0.92
Italy 726707.00 739360.00 0.0174 1736593 1766168 0.0170 1.02
Latvia 8424.40 9084.30 0.0783 26798 29056 0.0843 0.93
Lithuania 12477.00 13671.60 0.0957 42269 45264 0.0709 1.35
Luxembourg 22100.80 24594.00 0.1128 56814 60053 0.0570 1.98
Malta 3693.40 4008.20 0.0852 11322 12403 0.0955 0.89
Netherlands 286084.00 300351.00 0.0499 738146 774039 0.0486 1.03
Poland 162895.20 178337.40 0.0948 467313 497590 0.0648 1.46
Portugal 71261.60 75472.20 0.0591 195947 204305 0.0427 1.39
Romania 48343.80 54895.10 0.1355 187773 204640 0.0898 1.51
Slovakia 28819.30 30638.30 0.0631 84521 89606 0.0602 1.05
Slovenia 16113.00 17270.60 0.0718 42987 45755 0.0644 1.12
Spain 400152.00 423153.00 0.0575 1161878 1202193 0.0347 1.66
Sweden 213789.00 208653.10 –0.0240 480026 470673 –0.0195 1.23
United Kingdom 823775.20 845278.10 0.0261 2363109 2423737 0.0257 1.02
Source: compiled by the authors based on Eurostat data. 
Purchasing power parities (PPPs), price level indices and real expenditures for ESA 2010 aggre-
gates. Available at: https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do; Main 





























































































































Fig. 1. Tax elasticities in EU countries in 2017–2018
Source: compiled by the authors based on Eurostat data
Purchasing power parities (PPPs), price level indices and real expenditures for ESA 2010 aggregates. 
Available at: https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do; Main 
national accounts tax aggregates. Available at: https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.
do?dataset=gov_10a_taxag&lang=en
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According to the IMF, global growth 
is projected at –4.9% in 2020, 1.9% below 
the April 2020 World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) forecast. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has had a more negative impact on activi-
ty in the first half of 2020 than anticipated, 
and the recovery is projected to be more 
gradual than previously forecast. In 2021 
global growth is projected at 5.4%. Ove-
rall, this would leave 2021 GDP some 6.5% 
lower than in the pre-COVID-19 projec-
tions of January 20205.
Leading analysts are making cau-
tious predictions concerning the impact of 
the pandemic on the future of individual 
countries and global economy in general. 
For instance, in her report, Isabel Schna-
bel, Member of the Executive Board of the 
ECB, pointed out that the revisions to in-
flation expectations for the coming years 
have been limited and that any mid-point 
forecast therefore needs to be taken with a 
grain of salt6. 
IMF analysts have published guide-
lines for preparing the 2021 budget by 
taking into account the pandemic situa-
tion7. In particular, it is emphasized that, 
with the 2020 budget execution diver- 
ging widely from its projected course 
amid high uncertainty, budgeting during 
the crisis becomes a continuous reactive 
process, placing strains on ministries of 
finance. 
In addition to macroeconomic fore-
casts for the key economic indicators for 
2020 and 2021, the European Commission 
publishes biannual reports. There are also 
interim reports with estimates adjusted to 
5 World Economic Outlook Update, June 
2020. Available at:   https://www.imf.org/
en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/
WEOUpdateJune2020.
6 The ECB’s response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Available at:  https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.
sp200416~4d6bd9b9c0.en.html.
7 Teresa Curristine. Laura Doherty. Bruno 
Imbert. Fazeer Sheik Rahim. Vincent Tang and 
Claude Wendling. Budgeting in a Crisis: Gui-
dance for Preparing the 2021 Budget. Special 
Series on COVID-19. June 29. 2020. Available 
at:  https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SP-
ROLLs/covid19-special-notes.
the changes in the factors that determine 
the economic situation. 
Between 2019 and August 2020, GDP 
volume forecasts changed twice (see Ta-
ble 2).
The indicator “Variation” in the Sum-
mer 2020 Forecast in comparison with the 
Autumn 2019 Forecast shows a consider-
able degree of variation. It means that in 
the calculations of GDP growth estimates 
for 2020 made in the summer of 2020, 
adjustments were made for a variety of 
factors, including tax revenues, which are 
also analyzed by Eurostat8. The calcula-
tions of tax revenues take into account 
tax relief offered by EU countries. 
Thus, the calculations of forecast 
GDP growth for 2020 took into account 
the influence of anti-crisis fiscal measures 
in EU countries. This aspect can be used 
for preliminary analysis of the impact 
of anti-crisis fiscal measures on GDP 
growth.
Analysis of the variations shows that 
the most significant changes in the sum-
mer forecast in comparison with the au-
tumn forecast were found in the estimates 
of GDP growth in the following coun-
tries: Croatia (–13.4%); Spain (–12.4%); 
Ireland (–12.0%), France (–11.9%). The 
smallest variation in predicted GDP va-
lues was observed for Sweden (–6.3%), 
Denmark (–6.7%), Germany (–7.3%), Fin-
land (–7.4%). This fact can be considered 
as an indirect evidence pointing to the 
fact that the indicators of the first group 
of countries were more affected by the 
pandemic and these countries’ response 
measures (including fiscal measures) 
than the corresponding indicators of the 
second group.
If we compare the Summer 2020 Fore-
cast with the Spring 2020 Forecast, we can 
see that in the former case, the variations 
are less substantial. The countries that 
saw the biggest plunge in GDP growth are 
Portugal (–3.0%), France (–2.4%), and Slo-
vakia (–2.3%).
8 Tax revenue statistics. Available at:  https://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Tax_revenue_statistics




Variation of gross domestic product, volume 












2020 forecast /  
Autumn 2019 forecast
Variation Summer 
2020 forecast / Spring 
2020 forecast
1 2 3 4 5 6
Austria 1.4 –5.5 –7.1 –8.5 –1.6
Belgium 1.0 –7.2 –8.8 –9.8 –1.6
Bulgaria 3.0 –7.2 –7.1 –10.1 0.1
Croatia 2.6 –9.1 –10.8 –13.4 –1.7
Cyprus 2.6 –7.4 –7.7 –10.3 –0.3
Czechia 2.2 –6.2 –7.8 –10.0 –1.6
Denmark 1.5 –5.9 –5.2 –6.7 0.7
Estonia 2.1 –6.9 –7.7 –9.8 –0.8
Finland 1.1 –6.3 –6.3 –7.4 0
France 1.3 –8.2 –10.6 –11.9 –2.4
Germany 1.0 –6.5 –6.3 –7.3 0.2
Greece 2.3 –9.7 –9.0 –11.3 0.7
Hungary 2.8 –7.0 –7.0 –9.8 0
Ireland 3.5 –7.9 –8.5 –12.0 –0.6
Italy 0.4 –9.5 –11.2 –11.6 –1.7
Latvia 2.6 –7.0 –7.0 –9.6 0
Lithuania 2.4 –7.9 –7.1 –9.5 0.8
Luxembourg 2.6 –5.4 –6.2 –8.8 –0.8
Malta 4.2 –5.8 –6.0 –10.2 –0.2
Netherlands 1.3 –6.8 –6.8 –8.1 0
Poland 3.3 –4.3 –4.6 –7.9 –0.3
Portugal 1.7 –6.8 –9.8 –11.5 –3.0
Romania 3.6 –6.0 –6.0 –9.6 0
Slovakia 2.6 –6.7 –9.0 –11.6 –2.3
Slovenia 2.7 –7.0 –7.0 –9.7 0
Spain 1.5 –9.4 –10.9 –12.4 –1.5
Sweden 1.0 –6.1 –5.3 –6.3 0.8
United Kingdom 1.4 –8.3 –9.7 –11.1 –1.4
Source: compiled by the authors based on Eurostat data. 
European Economic Forecast. Spring 2020. Institutional paper 125 | May 2020. Available at: 
https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Spring-2020-Economic-Forecast.pdf; Euro-
pean Economic Forecast. Summer 2020 (Interim). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/
files/economy-finance/summer_2020_economic_forecast_-_statistical_annex.pdf 
In 2021, according to Eurostat, the 
negative impact of the pandemic on GDP 
will be mitigated and/or overcome and 
European countries will gradually improve 
their economic performance (Table 3).
The biggest positive variations in the 
Summer 2020 Forecast in comparison 
with the Autumn 2019 Forecast for GDP 
growth are observed for France (6.4%), 
Italy (6.4%), Spain (5.7%) and Belgium 
(5.5%); the smallest variations, for Finland 
(1.8%), Poland (1.0%), Romania (0.7%), 
and Sweden (1.7%). 
The variations in the forecasts of GDP 
growth for the summer of 2020 made in 
spring can be characterized as insignifi-
cant. The biggest variations were found in 
the forecasts for Greece (–1.9%), Sweden 
(–1.2%), Slovenia (–0.6%) and Germany 
(–0.6%).
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6. Analysis of fiscal responses of EU 
countries to the COVID-19 pandemic
In the majority of countries, tax reve-
nues are crucial for the state budget. We 
cannot but agree with IMF specialists’ 
opinion that the fiscal policy is at the fore-
front of the struggle against the pandemic9. 
Fiscal measures can help save lives, pro-
tect the most vulnerable social groups 
9 Fiscal monitor reports. Fiscal monitor – 
April 2020. Reports International Monetary 
Fund.  Available at:   https://www.imf.org/
en/publications/fm/issues/2020/04/06/fiscal-
monitor-april-2020.
and companies from the economic conse-
quences of the pandemic and prevent the 
countries experiencing health-care crisis 
from plunging into a deep and prolonged 
recession. Fiscal policy is going to be one 
of the primary means of stimulating eco-
nomic recovery after the end of the lock-
down and pandemic.
In this study, we are going to focus on 
the impact of fiscal anti-crisis measures 
in EU countries on their gross domestic 
product. The results of this analysis may 
prove useful to fiscal policy-makers in the 
future.
Table 3
Variation of gross domestic product, volume 











Variation Summer 2020 
forecast / Autumn 2019 
forecast
Variation Summer 
2020 forecast / Spring 
2020 forecast
1 2 3 4 5 6
Austria 1.4 5.0 5.6 4.2 0.6
Belgium 1.0 6.7 6.5 5.5 –0.2
Bulgaria 2.9 6.0 5.3 2.4 –0.7
Croatia 2.4 7.5 7.5 5.1 0
Cyprus 0.7 6.1 5.3 4.6 –0.8
Czechia 2.1 5.0 4.5 2.4 –0.5
Denmark 1.6 5.1 4.3 2.7 –0.8
Estonia 2.4 5.9 6.2 3.8 0.3
Finland 1.0 3.7 2.8 1.8 –0.9
France 1.2 7.4 7.6 6.4 0.2
Germany 1.0 5.9 5.3 4.3 –0.6
Greece 2.0 7.9 6.0 4.0 –1.9
Hungary 2.8 6.0 6.0 3.2 0
Ireland 3.2 6.1 6.3 3.1 0.2
Italy 0.1 6.5 6.1 6.4 –0.4
Latvia 2.7 6.4 6.4 3.7 0
Lithuania 2.4 7.4 6.7 4.3 –0.7
Luxembourg 2.6 5.7 5.4 2.8 –0.3
Malta 3.8 6.0 6.3 2.5 0.3
Netherlands 1.3 5.0 4.6 3.3 –0.4
Poland 3.3 4.1 4.3 1.0 0.2
Portugal 1.7 5.8 6.0 4.3 0.2
Romania 3.3 4.2 4.0 0.7 –0.2
Slovakia 2.7 6.6 7.4 4.7 0.8
Slovenia 2.7 6.7 6.1 3.4 –0.6
Spain 1.4 7.0 7.1 5.7 0.1
Sweden 1.4 4.3 3.1 1.7 –1.2
United Kingdom 1.4 6.0 6.0 4.6 0
Source: compiled by the authors based on Eurostat data. 
European Economic Forecast. Spring 2020. Institutional paper 125 | May 2020. Available at: 
https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Spring-2020-Economic-Forecast.pdf; Euro-
pean Economic Forecast. Summer 2020 (Interim). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/
files/economy-finance/summer_2020_economic_forecast_-_statistical_annex.pdf 
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Due to the lack of statistical data, the 
effects of fiscal measures taken by EU 
countries in response to the pandemic 
have not been analyzed yet. However, 
the IMF has already published descriptive 
statistics10 summarizing the key fiscal re-
sponses of EU countries (Table 4).
Figure 2 illustrates the fiscal measures 
undertaken by EU countries in response 
to the pandemic.
The Czech Republic and Ireland used 
most of the tax instruments – 4 out of 5. 
10 Policy responses to COVID-19. Policy 
Tracker. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/
Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-
COVID-19#A.
These countries are the leaders in terms of 
diversity of their anti-crisis fiscal measures. 
They are followed by Austria, Hungary 
and the UK (3 out of 5 instruments). The 
majority of countries resorted to 2 instru-
ments – Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Fin-
land, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. 
Some countries used only one – Croa-
tia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, 
while some did not use any at all, for 
example, Latvia and Lithuania.
Our analysis of EU countries’ fiscal 
policy responses to the COVID-19 pan-
demic is summarized by Figure 3.
Table 4
Fiscal responses of EU countries to the COVID-19 pandemic
Country Deferral of taxes






butions (cancellation / 
reduction)VAT income tax 
Austria + – + – + –
Belgium + – – + – –
Bulgaria + + – – – –
Croatia + – – – – –
Cyprus + + – – – –
Czechia + + – + – +
Denmark + – – – – –
Estonia – – – – – +
Finland + – – – + –
France + – – – + –
Germany – + – – – –
Greece + + – – – –
Hungary + – – – + +
Ireland + + – + + –
Italy + – – – – +
Latvia – – – – – –
Lithuania – – – – – –
Luxembourg – – – – + –
Malta + – – – + –
Netherlands + – – – – –
Poland + – – + – –
Portugal + – – – – –
Romania + – – – + –
Slovakia + – – + – –
Slovenia + – – – + –
Spain + + – – – –
Sweden + – – – – –
United Kingdom + + – – + –
Source: compiled by the authors based on IMF data.
Policy responses to COVID-19. Policy Tracker. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/
imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#A. 



















Percentage of use, %
Fig. 3. Analysis of fiscal instruments 
used by EU countries in their policy 
responses to the pandemic
Сompiled by the authors based on IMF data
Policy responses to COVID-19. Policy Tracker. 
Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-
and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#A
Most European countries (82%) re-
sorted to deferral of taxes to cope with the 
consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Other instruments, such as temporary tax 
breaks (36%) and reduction of tax rates 
(32%), were used much less frequently. 
The third group of instruments includes 
tax loss carryforwards (18 %) and cancel-
lation or reduction of social security con-
tributions (14 %).
The anti-crisis fiscal measures taken 
by EU countries, including tax reliefs, will 
result in the decline of tax revenue to these 
countries’ state budgets.
7. Clustering of EU countries depending 
on the efficiency of their fiscal 
anti-crisis measures and GDP forecasts
We used cluster analysis to show the 
connection between fiscal anti-crisis mea-
sures and GDP forecasts. Figure 4 illus-
trates clustering of EU countries depend-




































































































































Tree Diagram for 28 Cases
Ward’s method
Euclidean distances
Fig. 4. Dendrogram of hierarchical clustering of EU countries depending 
on the direction of their fiscal policy responses 
Compiled by the authors based on IMF data


































































































































Percentage of use of fiscal measures
Fig. 2. Fiscal responses of EU countries to the COVID-19 pandemic
Сompiled by the authors based on on IMF data
Policy responses to COVID-19. Policy Tracker. Available at:  
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#A 
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Table 5 illustrates how EU countries 
were grouped into clusters depending on 
the direction of their fiscal anti-crisis mea-
sures.
Table 5
Grouping of EU countries depending 
on the direction of their fiscal anti-crisis 
measures
1




Min = 0; 
Max = 20
2
Cyprus, Greece, Malta, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Romania, 




3 Austria, Hungary, United Kingdom, Czechia, Ireland
Min = 60;
Max = 80
Source: compiled by the authors based on 
IMF data.
Policy responses to COVID-19. Policy 
Tracker. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/
Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-
COVID-19#A. 
It should be noted that, in addition to 
taxation, EU countries implemented ac-
tive anti-crisis measures in other spheres. 
Remarkably, those countries that made 
the most active use of fiscal measures, 
such as the Czech Republic and Ireland, 
also implemented a wide range of other 
anti-crisis measures.
For example, the government of the 
Czech Republic introduced a fiscal pack-
age of CZK 249.3 billion (€9.4 billion, 
4.5 percent of GDP)11. The Irish authori-
ties announced a comprehensive fiscal 
package of €24.5 billion (about 14% of 
GDP), distributed over 2020 and 2021, 
which includes €20.5 billion in direct sup-
port and €4 billion in indirect support. 
To analyze the effect of fiscal anti-
crisis measures on GDP indicators, we 
conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis 
of EU countries by looking at their GDP 
growth in 2020 (Fig. 5).
11 Policy responses to COVID-19. Policy 
Tracker. Czech Republic. Available at: https://
www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/
Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#A.




































































































































Fig. 5. Dendrogram of hierarchical clustering of EU countries depending 
on their GDP growth in 2020
Compiled by the authors based on IMF data
Policy responses to COVID-19. Policy Tracker. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-
and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#A
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Table 6 illustrates the allocation of EU 
countries to clusters depending on their 
GDP growth in 2020.
Table 6
Grouping of EU countries 
into clusters depending 



























Figure 6 illustrates the clustering of 
EU countries depending on their GDP 
growth in 2021.
Characteristics of the clusters are gi-
ven in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7
Grouping of EU countries into clusters 
depending on their GDP growth in 2021
Cluster Country Characteristic


























































































































































Fig. 6. Dendrogram of hierarchical clustering of EU countries depending 
on their GDP growth in 2021
Compiled by the authors based on IMF data
Policy responses to COVID-19. Policy Tracker. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-
and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#A




Final results of the cluster analysis of EU countries depending on their fiscal 
anti-crisis measures and the impact of these measures on GDP growth in 2020–2021
Country
Cluster
direction of anti-crisis measures 
in fiscal policy
change in GDP 
for 2020
change in GDP 
for 2021
Austria 3 3 3
Belgium 2 2 3
Bulgaria 2 2 2
Croatia 1 1 3
Cyprus 2 2 3
Czechia 3 2 2
Denmark 1 3 2
Estonia 1 2 2
Finland 2 3 1
France 2 1 3
Germany 1 3 3
Greece 2 1 2
Hungary 3 2 2
Ireland 3 1 2
Italy 2 1 3
Latvia 1 2 2
Lithuania 1 2 3
Luxembourg 1 3 2
Malta 2 2 2
Netherlands 1 3 2
Poland 2 3 1
Portugal 1 1 3
Romania 2 2 1
Slovakia 2 1 3
Slovenia 2 2 2
Spain 2 1 3
Sweden 1 3 1
United Kingdom 3 1 3
Only in 4 countries out of 28 (Austria, 
Bulgaria, Malta, Slovenia), the results of 
clustering according to the type and num-
ber of anti-crisis fiscal measures coincide 
with clustering according to the changes 
in the level of GDP in 2020–2021. Interes-
tingly, these four countries do not belong 
to the group of countries that implemented 
anti-crisis fiscal measures most actively.
In view of the above, a conclusion can 
be made that Hypothesis 1 regarding the 
direct connection between the anti-crisis 
fiscal packages implemented by the coun-
tries and a drop in economic growth was 
not confirmed since the results of country 
clustering have not shown a correlation 
between their fiscal policy responses and 
GDP growth. 
8. Conclusions
Our study has brought to light chal-
lenges in forecasting tax revenue due 
to the uncertainty surrounding the CO-
VID-19 pandemic. The best way to tackle 
the problem of variation in forecasts is to 
monitor the situation and adjust the esti-
mates accordingly. 
Our analysis of the coefficient of tax 
elasticity for EU countries in 2017–2020 
has shown a high elasticity of taxes. Al-
though elasticity cannot be considered a 
reliable indicator for tax revenue forecasts 
due to the higher-than-usual degree of un-
certainty during the pandemic, we can 
still argue that there is an indirect relation-
ship between fiscal anti-crisis measures in 
EU countries and GDP growth. Thus, Hy-
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pothesis 1 about the indirect connection 
between fiscal anti-crisis measures and 
GDP growth is confirmed while Hypothe-
sis 2 is refuted.
We analyzed the variations in GDP 
forecasts for 2020 and conducted a cluster 
analysis of European countries, which led 
us to identify the countries whose forecast 
estimates of GDP growth are most prone 
to variation – Croatia, Spain, Ireland and 
France. 
Our analysis of anti-crisis fiscal mea-
sures and clustering showed that the coun-
tries which made the most active use of 
such measures were the Czech Republic 
and Ireland as these countries used 4 instru-
ments out of 5. These are followed by Aus-
tria, Hungary and the UK (3 instruments). 
Clusters of EU countries that took 
anti-crisis fiscal measures generally do 
not coincide with the clusters of countries 
grouped according to forecast estimates 
of their GDP growth. At the same time, 
since GDP forecasts take into account, 
among other things, changes in tax reve-
nues, which to some extent result from 
anti-crisis fiscal measures, we could make 
a tentative evaluation of the relationship 
between these two indicators. 
The countries that are actively imple-
menting fiscal anti-crisis measures (lea-
ding to a reduction in tax revenues) are 
not among those with the most alarming 
GDP growth figures. Interestingly, the re-
vised GDP projections for such countries 
do not significantly differ from base ones. 
This can be explained by the fact that GDP 
growth is also affected by other indicators, 
for example, national monetary policies. 
In our view, this confirms the hypothesis 
that fiscal anti-crisis measures adopted in 
EU countries do not have a direct impact 
on GDP indicators.
It takes time for anti-crisis fiscal mea-
sures to produce noticeable effects. Ho-
wever, the projections for those countries 
that have made the most active use of such 
measures already demonstrate positive 
dynamics. Thus, for European govern-
ments it would make sense to analyze the 
experience and achievements of the lea-
ding countries in this sphere (the Czech 
Republic, Ireland and the UK) and add 
the most efficient instruments to their own 
anti-crisis packages. 
Our study has revealed a non-uniform 
impact of fiscal policy responses on eco-
nomic indicators of individual EU coun-
tries since, on top of everything else, anti-
crisis measures may affect gross national 
income and thereby EU budget’s own re-
sources used to finance different kinds of 
projects and programs, inclu-ding those 
aimed at countering the effects of the pan-
demic. As a result, the EU budget’s own 
resources may decrease, which will in-
evitably hit national budgets of European 
countries affected by the pandemic. 
Journal of Tax Reform. 2020;6(3):225–243
242
ISSN 2412-8872
10. Boadway R. From Optimal Tax Theory to Tax Policy: Retrospective and Prospective Views. 
Cambridge (Mass.), The MTI Press; 2012. 304 p.
11. Anwar Sh. Fiscal Decentralization in Developing and Transition Economies: Progress, 
Problems, and the Promise. Policy Research Working Paper; 2004, No. 3282. 47 p. Available at: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14114
12. Romer C.D., Romer D.H. The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based 
on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks. American Economic Review. 2010;100(3):763–801. DOI: 
10.1257/aer.100.3.763.
13. Folster S., Henrekson M. Growth Effects of Government Expenditure and Taxation 
in Rich Countries. European Economic Review. 2001;45(8):1501–1520. DOI: 10.1016/S0014- 
2921(00)00083-0.
14. James S., Sawyer A., Budak T. (eds). The Complexity of Tax Simplification: Experiences from 
Around the World. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2016. 273 p.
15. Laffer A.B., Moore S., Sinquefield R.A., Brown T.H. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of States: How Taxes, Energy, and Worker Freedom Change Everything. Wiley; 2014. 368 p.
16. De Mooij R., Nicodème G. Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector. Cambridge 
(Mass.), The MIT Press; 2015. 417 p. DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027977.001.0001.
17. Alworth J., Arachi G. Taxation and the Financial Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
2012. 321 p. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698165.001.0001.
18. Engen E., Skinner J. Taxation and Economic Growth. National Tax Journal. 
1996;49(4):617–642. DOI: 10.3386/w5826.
19. Piqué M., Martín J. The Role of Fiscal Policy in Spain from 2007 to 2010 and the Influence 
of Aggregate Public Spending on Economic Growth. Open Journal of Business and Management. 
2013;1(3):59–75. DOI: 10.4236/ojbm.2013.13009.
20. Yang Z. Tax Reform, Fiscal Decentralization, and Regional Economic Growth: New 
Evidence from China. Economic Modelling. 2016;59:520–528. DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.07.020.
21. Alesina A., Giavazzi F. Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis. Chicago; London: The 
University of Chicago Press; 2016. 585 p.
22. Cottarelly C., Cottarelli C., Gerson P., Senhadji A. (eds). Post-crisis Fiscal Policy. The MIT 
Press; 2014. 576 p. DOI: 10.1111/1475-4932.12215.
23. Slemrod J. Lessons for Tax Policy in the Great Recession. National Tax Journal. 
2009;62(3):387–397. DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2009.3.02.
24. Brondolo J. Collecting Taxes During an Economic Crisis: Challenges and Policy Options. 
IMF Staff Position Note. 2009;(17):39. DOI: 10.5089/9781462339440.004.
25. Blanchard O., Leigh D. Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers. American Economic 
Review. 2013;103(3):117–120. DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.3.117.
26. Alesina A., Carloni D., Lecce G. The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments. 
In: Alesina A., Francesco G. (eds) Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis. University of Chicago 
Press; 2012, pp. 531–570.
27. Hallerberg M., Scartascini C. Explaining Changes in Tax Burdens in Latin America: 
Do Politics Trump Economics? European Journal of Political Economy. 2017;48:162–179. DOI: 
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.07.004.
28. Mikesell J. L. Election Periods and State Tax Policy Cycles. Public Choice. 1978;33(3):99–106. 
DOI: 10.1007/BF00154687.
29. Chirinko R.S., Wilson D.J. State Investment Tax Incentives: A Zero-Sum Game? Journal 
of Public Economics. 2008;92(12):2362–2384. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.07.005.
30. Crespi G., Giuliodori D., Giuliodori R., Rodriguez A. The Effectiveness of Tax Incentives 
for R&D+i in Developing Countries: The Case of Argentina. Research Policy. 2016;45(10):2023–2035. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2016.07.006.
31. Easson A., Zolt E.M. Tax Incentives. Washington: World Bank Institute; 2002. 36 p.
32. Yefimenko T.I. Taxation in Reforms of Public Finance Management. Journal of Tax 
Reform. 2016;2(1):6–24. DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2016.2.1.014.
33. Bonucchi M., Ferrari M., Tomasini S., Tsenova T. Tax Policy, Investment Decisions and 
Economic Growth. Revue de l’OFCE. 2015;5(141):225–262. DOI: 10.3917/reof.141.0225.
34. Kalas B., Mirovic V., Andrasic J. Estimating the Impact of Taxes on the Economic Growth 
in the United States. Economic Themes. 2017;55(4):481–499. DOI: 10.1515/ethemes-2017-0027.
35. Pogorletskiy A.I. Historical Reconstruction of the Impact of Pandemics on the 
Development of Indirect Taxation. Journal of Applied Economic Research. 2020;19(2):180–207. 
(In Russ.) DOI: 10.15826/vestnik.2020.19.2.010.
Journal of Tax Reform. 2020;6(3):225–243
243
ISSN 2412-8872
Information about the authors
Vlada V. Karpova – PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Custom and Taxation, 
Simon Kuznets Kharkin National University of Economics; (Kharkiv, 61166, Ukraine); 
ORCID: 0000-0003-3712-0391; e-mail: vladavika@gmail.com
Viktoriia F. Tyschenko – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor, Head 
of the Department of Сustom and Taxation, Simon Kusnets Kharkiv National 
University of Economics; Kharkiv, 61166, Ukraine); ORCID: 0000-0001-5924-2061; 
e-mail: vf_hneu@ukr.net
Viktoriia N. Ostapenko – PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Custom and 
Taxation, Simon Kuznets Kharkin National University of Economics; (Kharkiv, 
61166, Ukraine); ORCID: 0000-0002-4077-5738; e-mail: viktoria.ostapenko@hneu.net
Yuriy B. Ivanov – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Director of Research Centre 
for Industrial Problems of Development of the National Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine (Kharkiv, 61166, Ukraine); ORCID: 0000-0002-5309-400X; e-mail: yuriy.
ivanov.ua@gmail.com
For citation
Karpova V.V., Tischenko V.F., Ostapenko V.N., Ivanov Yu.B. Anti-Crisis Fiscal 
Measures in the European Union during the COVID-19 Pandemic and their Impact 
on GDP. Journal of Tax Reform. 2020;6(3):225–243. DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2020.6.3.083.
Article info
Received September 1, 2020; Revised October 5, 2020; Accepted October 20, 2020
Информация об авторах
Карпова Влада Викторовна – кандидат экономических наук, доцент кафедры 
таможенного дела и налогообложения, Харьковский национальный эконо-
мический университет имени Семена Кузнеца (61166, Украина, г. Харьков); 
ORCID: 0000-0003-3712-0391; e-mail: vladavika@gmail.com
Тищенко Виктория Федоровна – доктор экономических наук, заведующая кафе-
дрой таможенного дела и налогообложения, Харьковский национальный эко-
номический университет имени Семена Кузнеца (61166, Украина, г. Харьков); 
ORCID: 0000-0001-5924-2061; e-mail: vf_hneu@ukr.net
Остапенко Виктория Николаевна – кандидат экономических наук, доцент кафе-
дры таможенного дела и налогообложения, Харьковский национальный эко-
номический университет имени Семена Кузнеца (61166, Украина, г. Харьков); 
ORCID: 0000-0002-4077-5738; e-mail: viktoria.ostapenko@hneu.net
Иванов Юрий Борисович – доктор экономических наук, профессор, директор 
Научно-исследовательского центра индустриальных проблем развития Наци-
ональной академии наук Украины (61166, Украина, г. Харьков); ORCID: 0000-
0002-5309-400X; e-mail: yuriy.ivanov.ua@gmail.com
Для цитирования
Карпова В.В., Тищенко В.Ф., Остапенко В.Н., Иванов Ю.Б. Фискальные анти-
кризисные меры в Европейском Союзе в условиях распространения COVID-19: 
оценки влияния на ВВП // Journal of Tax Reform. – 2020. – Т. 6, № 3. – С. 225–243. – 
DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2020.6.3.083.
Информация о статье
Дата поступления 1 сентября 2020 г.; дата поступления после рецензирования 
5 октября 2020 г.; дата принятия к печати 20 октября 2020 г.
